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Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of managerial entrenchment
on private placements by examining the firm's decision to appoint
representatives of the private investors to the board without shareholder
approval. By analyzing a sample of U.S. firms that appoint directors in
combination with private offerings between 1995 and 2000, we find that firms
with greater managerial entrenchment are more likely to bypass shareholder
approval. Firms that bypass shareholders are less likely to appoint
independent directors or to elect one of these directors as chairman. We also
show that the market reacts more positively to the private offering
announcement when the firm submits its board candidates for shareholder
approval. Further, firms that bypass approval underperform compared to
firms that obtain it. Overall our findings suggest that managers avoid
shareholder approval to perpetuate entrenchment.
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1. Introduction
The conventional view of private equity placements as a
mechanism to enhance external monitoring has been recently
challenged by studies arguing that managers can use private
placements to promote their own entrenchment (i.e., Wu (2004) and
Barclay et al. (2007-this issue)). In this paper we contribute to the
debate over the governance implications of private placements by
analyzing a heretofore unexamined aspect of that process. Specifically,
we examine the decision to appoint representatives of private
investors to the firm's board of directors without a vote of the
shareholders.
Wruck (1989) finds that private placements in which investors
are appointed to the board are characterized by significantly lower
announcement period returns. She conjectures that the appointment
of these individuals without shareholder approval might be the cause
of the lower returns. This study tests her conjecture and provides an
estimate of value of shareholder participation in the selection of a
firm's board of directors. Such analysis has important implications for
corporate governance, especially in environments where super-voting
rights might exist or external equity investors are otherwise
disadvantaged.
Our analysis of the circumvention of shareholder approval for
the appointment of directors also contributes to a continuing policy
debate regarding the extent of shareholder power in the director
election process and the role of independent directors. Even though a
2003 SEC proposal on this issue stalled due to the opposition of senior
industry executives, by early 2006 some firms have implemented
changes in their bylaws to increase shareholder power during the
director election process. These changes are consistent with the
position advocated by activist shareholders and various legal
academics.2 Further, since this research examines the effects resulting
from the nullification of a basic shareholder right, it benchmarks the
impact that violation, of one share-one vote rules might have on firms
in countries with weak protection of shareholder interests.
Wruck (1989) suggests that the appointment of directors without
shareholder approval at the time of a private offering might imply
managerial entrenchment. According to this view, managers bypass
shareholders and appoint to the board individuals who are aligned with
current management and unlikely to provide independent monitoring.
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Such directors are likely to be less effective monitors than those who
are regularly elected by shareholders. Barclay et al. (2007-this issue)
and Wu (2004) argue that firms are more likely to privately place
securities with investors who promise to vote their shares in managers'
favor and consequently protect managers' positions. If true, this is
more likely to occur when firms assign directorships to representatives
of these private investors. As long as entrenched managers estimate
the probability that shareholders will oppose their slate of board
candidates to be greater than zero, they will more likely circumvent
the shareholder election process to appoint "friendly" investors to the
board.3 We call this the entrenchment hypothesis.
Berle and Means (1932) and more recently Demb and Neubauer
(1992) and Lorsch (1989), question the importance of shareholder
voting for directors since the firm's proxy committee is appointed by
the existing management and the proxy slate is usually elected,
resulting in management virtually "dictating their own successors".
Although state corporate law requires that shareholders select the
board of directors, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) observe that even
in the extreme case of a proxy fight, shareholders win board seats only
one-third of the time. Bebchuck (2003) contends that shareholders
seeking to exercise their right to replace directors face substantial
obstacles and that, apart from hostile takeovers, the incidence of
shareholder challenges to directors is negligible. Since shareholders
virtually always vote for management's slate of candidates, managers
might estimate the probability that shareholders will reject their slate
of candidates to be zero. If true, managers do not need to circumvent
shareholders to perpetuate entrenchment, and the firm's decision to
bypass shareholders would not be symptomatic of weak corporate
governance. We call this the approval irrelevance hypothesis.
A third possibility might be that managers bypass shareholder
approval when private investors demand immediate board
representation as a condition for providing capital because of concern
about managerial exploitation of firm resources and consumption of
agency perquisites. If true, companies that bypass shareholder
approval might be characterized ex-ante by poor corporate
governance, but will more likely increase the monitoring quality of the
board at the time of the private placement. We call this the monitoring
hypothesis.4
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We test these three competing hypothesis by analyzing a
sample of U.S. firms that appoint directors in combination with private
offerings between 1995 and 2000. We find that firms in which
managers are entrenched are more likely to bypass shareholder
approval of board appointments at the time of the private placement.
Firms that bypass shareholders are less likely to appoint independent
directors or to elect a new independent director as chairman of the
board. We also find that the stock market reacts more positively to the
announcement of the private offering when the firm submits board
candidates for shareholder approval. Further, we show that firms that
bypass shareholder approval significantly underperform after the
private offering compared to firms that obtain shareholder approval.
We conclude from our findings that the firm's decision to circumvent
shareholder ratification is most consistent with the entrenchment
hypothesis.

2. The role of shareholder voting in corporate
governance
The right of shareholders to vote for the members of the board
of directors provides an important connection between ownership and
control. As described by Fama and Jensen (1983), ratification and
monitoring are two important steps in the decision process of a
corporation. The approval of directorships by the shareholders is a
fundamental element of these ratification and monitoring steps.
Shareholder voting rights are considered by the financial contracting
literature as a valid alternative to contracts. Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1988) and Hart and Moore (1990) contend
that contracts cannot specify all future contingencies and that voting
rights might offer a partial remedy since they can be used to ratify
decisions ex-post. Moreover, Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Kaplan
and Stromberg (2003) note that voting rights can shift between
managers and outside investors depending on the firm's financial
performance.
Even though shareholder voting to approve board proposals is a
fundamental shareholder right, does it make a difference? Berle and
Means (1932) argue that diffuse ownership decreases shareholder
incentive to vote or to otherwise attempt to influence corporate
decisions, thus resulting in the approval of management proposals in
most circumstances. Alternatively, Easterbrook and Fischel (1983)
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argue that shareholder voting rights are an effective monitoring tool.
Bethel and Gillan (2002) show that for non-routine proposals (i.e.,
when brokers cannot vote on behalf of shareholders) a larger number
of votes is cast against management. However routine management
proposals are usually ratified, providing managers with the incentive to
classify a proposal as "routine" to increase the likelihood of approval.
Burch et al. (2004) analyze acquiring firm merger proxies and find that
many deals are only narrowly approved, suggesting that shareholder
voting rights are not merely perfunctory. Balachandran et al. (2004)
empirically analyze the causes and consequences of shareholder voting
rights and find that firms with poor performance and weak internal
governance tend to adopt equity-based compensation plans without
shareholder approval. These firms also tend to continue their poor
performance even after the adoption of the compensation plan.

3. How do firms appoint directors without
shareholder approval?
Firms that plan to issue securities privately and appoint
representatives of these private purchasers to the board might ask for
shareholder approval of the security issuance as well as the director
nominees. Even though this study focuses on shareholder approval of
the directorships, we also consider the approval of the security
issuance since in the context of private offerings these are often
related actions.

3.1. Private security issuance without shareholder
approval
If the number of authorized common shares in the firm's
certificate of incorporation is larger than the number of shares
outstanding, the firm can issue common stock without shareholder
approval unless required by the listing exchange. Moreover, a firm can
issue convertible preferred shares without shareholder approval if it
has a blank check preferred stock provision in its certificate of
incorporation. A blank check preferred stock provision gives directors
the discretion to issue preferred stock with particular voting, dividend,
conversion and other rights without shareholder approval. Firms
without such a provision in their charter can issue a new class of
preferred stock only with shareholder approval. A company might also
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avoid shareholder approval by issuing convertible notes instead of
common equity or preferred stock since convertible notes do not
require shareholder approval at the time of the issue.5
There are cases, however, in which the listing exchange requires
shareholder approval even when the common shares are already
authorized, a blank check preferred stock provision is present in the
certificate of incorporation, or convertible notes are issued. The New
York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and AMEX require shareholder
approval when the issuance of common stock or securities exercisable
or convertible into common stock is at least 20% of the common stock
or at least 20% of the voting power outstanding prior to the issuance
and is sold for less than the greater of book or market value of the
stock.6

3.2. Board appointments without shareholder approval
Usually the bylaws of a corporation do not require a specific
number of directors. More typically, they indicate a range such as "the
board of directors shall consist of no less than five, and no more than
ten members". In this case, the existing directors can add new
directors to the board without shareholder approval and without
amending the bylaws. If the addition of the new directors increases the
board size beyond the upper limit, the board can usually increase the
maximum number of directors without shareholder approval by
amending the bylaws.7
Another method that allows the appointment of directors
without shareholder approval is by replacement. The resignation of a
director creates a vacancy on the board that can be filled by a new
director without approval from shareholders. Firms can use these two
methods independently from a private offering to obtain the
appointments they seek. Firms, however, typically use these
stratagems in connection with private placements.
A strategy to bypass shareholders that requires the private
placement of securities can be implemented by issuing blank check
preferred securities, such as convertible preferred shares, that allow
investors to elect one or more directors. If a blank check preferred
stock provision is already present in the charter, no approval is
required to issue these securities. Although directors would have the
right to bypass shareholder approval under these conditions, the
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decision to do so must be weighed against their fiduciary
responsibilities towards shareholders.8
The duration over which shareholder approval of board
nominees is denied varies. Private purchasers of convertible securities
often have the special right to elect a certain number of directors
separately from common shareholders. In this case, shareholders are
circumvented indefinitely. If, however, the board adds new directors
because of the flexibility provided by the bylaws and the private
purchasers lack special voting rights, common shareholders must
ratify these appointments by election in a subsequent annual meeting.
If the board is not staggered, the election occurs not later than twelve
months after the private placement; if the board is staggered,
shareholders might have to wait as long as three years before voting
to ratify the directors' appointments.
It is also important to note that the approval of board
appointments in connection with private placements is more
discretionary than the approval of securities. For example, exchange
rules require shareholder approval of security issuances as described
earlier, but do not require the approval of directors. In essence, a firm
that asks shareholders to approve the private offering of new
securities does so because it is required, but a firm that asks
shareholders to approve the appointment of new directors in
connection with a private placement does so voluntarily.

3.3. The relation between approval of security issuance
and approval of board appointments
The approval of securities and the approval of board
appointments are sometimes interrelated. If a firm does not have a
blank check preferred stock provision in its charter, it must ask for
shareholder approval to issue preferred convertible shares. In the
proxy sent to investors, the company usually specifies the rights
associated with these securities. One of these rights might be the right
of preferred convertible stockholders to elect one or more directors in
addition to the directors regularly elected by common shareholders. In
this case, shareholders approve the issuance of convertible preferred
shares, while simultaneously permitting the firm and the private
investors to appoint directors.
When firms decide to privately issue more than 20% of their
fully diluted common stock and ask authorization from shareholders as
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September 2007): pg. 485-510. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

7

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

required by exchange rules, they often simultaneously declare their
intention to appoint directors and report the names of the appointees
in the proxy. In such case, the firm's shareholders implicitly approve
the board appointments when they vote in favor of the private
offering.
A firm can circumvent the exchange rules that require
shareholder approval by issuing less than 20% of the common stock.
In this case, the firm does not have to submit the security issuance
and the director nominees for shareholder approval. A few months
later, the firm asks for shareholder approval to sell the remaining
amount of equity it desires. The directors, however, are already
appointed and do not require shareholder approval.

4. Data and sample characteristics
4.1. A sample construction
We search Factiva for press releases that announce private
placements associated with board appointments for U.S. firms
between January 1995 to December 2000. We identify 185 placements
distributed over 181 unique firms that are covered by both CRSP and
Compustat at the time of the offering. For the four firms that privately
issue securities and grant directorships twice in our sample period, we
remove the second placement from our sample to eliminate potential
autocorrelation in our multivariate analysis. We collect issue
characteristics from 8-K and SC-13D filings, board characteristics,
insider ownership, and blockholder ownership from proxy statements,
institutional ownership from Compact Disclosure, accounting data from
Compustat, and stock prices and returns from CRSP. We list all
variables and their definitions in the Appendix.
We determine if a firm asks for shareholder approval of board
appointments in connection with the private placement by examining
press releases, 8-K filings, and proxy statements. A firm can seek
shareholder approval for its board candidates in two ways. First, the
firm can place representatives of the private investor on the slate for
the annual meeting election that follows the date of the private
placement. Alternatively, if the firm issues preferred stock but needs
to ask for shareholder approval because of the absence of a blank
check preferred stock provision, it may specify in the proxy the right of
preferred stockholders to elect directors in addition to those elected by
common shareholder. When common shareholders then approve the
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preferred stock issuance, they also approve the appointment of
directors by the private investors.

4.2. Sample characteristics
As reported in Panel A of Table 1, the majority of the sample
firms trade on NASDAQ (74.6%). Fisher's exact test of homogeneity
shows that firms asking for shareholder approval of board
appointments differ significantly in their distribution across stock
exchanges from firms not asking for shareholder approval. Firms that
trade on the NYSE are more likely to seek approval (29.4% versus
9.5%).
Panels B through F of Table 1 examine various characteristics of
our sample security issuances. The securities offered in the private
placements are generally common shares (38.4%) and convertible
preferred shares (42.2%). The majority of the private security issues
in our sample is not approved by shareholders (65.7%), and has
private equity firms as the private purchasers (60.0%). Almost half of
the offerings are associated with one board appointment (49.2%), but
not infrequently, private issues are connected with radical board
restructurings. Indeed, seven placements in our sample are associated
with the appointment of five or more directors. In most cases, firms
increase the size of their boards by appointing additional directors
(63.2%). In 28% of the cases, however, firms replace some of the
existing directors with representatives of the private investors. This
form of board restructuring does not change the size of the board. In a
few cases (8.6%), firms simultaneously replace and add directors.
The most noticeable difference between the approval/nonapproval subsamples is that firms that issue convertible preferred
shares and appoint a larger number of directors are more likely to
seek shareholder approval for their appointments. As mentioned in
Section 4.1, firms without a blank check provision in their charters that
desire to issue preferred shares with special rights typically present
the security issuance agreement in the proxy and submit it to the vote
of shareholders. Common shareholders approve the right of preferred
shareholders to appoint directors at the time they ratify the issuance
of the preferred shares since that is one of the rights specified in the
proxy. This particular approval mechanism explains why a higher
percentage of convertible preferred share issues is associated with
shareholder approval of board appointments. As shown by Panel C of
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Table 1, firms that ask for shareholder approval of privately placed
securities are also more likely to seek shareholder approval of board
appointments.
In Table 2 we present the mean (median) value of firm
characteristics, issue characteristics, governance, and past
performance variables for the full sample as well as the approval/nonapproval subsamples. The mean (median) value of total assets for the
full sample is $217.0 million ($47.3 million), and the mean (median)
market capitalization is $182.8 million ($53.4 million). The mean
(median) age, measured as the number of years that elapse between
the date of the CRSP listing and the issue date, is 6.17 years (4.14
years). These results are consistent with Wu (2004) who observes that
firms that privately place securities usually have just recently gone
public and are still small.
Our measure of free cash flow is calculated as in Lehn and
Poulsen (1989) and standardized by total assets (Freecash/assets).
The mean (median) of Freecash/assets is -$0.23 million (-$0.04
million), indicating that about half of our sample firms have negative
free cash flow.
On average, the fraction of common shares privately placed is
26%. The gross proceeds have a mean (median) of $46.74 million
($10 million). The fraction of shares placed is larger than those
presented by Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), and Wu (2004)
for two possible reasons. First, we include in our sample only private
placements associated with board appointments which, ceteris paribus,
are expected to be larger in size than private placements not
associated with board appointments. Second, we calculate the fraction
placed by converting all convertible securities distributed to private
investors, including warrants, into common stock.
We find that, on average, firms appoint 1.89 directors at the
time of the private placement; this changes the composition of 25% of
the board. The mean (median) board size is 6.53 (6). The small size of
the board of directors for the average firm in our sample is not
surprising given the small size and youth of our sample firms. The CEO
is also the chairman of the board in slightly more than half of the
sample firms (54%). The CEO is the founder of 33% of the sample
firms. In 68% of the sample firms the chairman is one of the top
managers. On average, insiders hold 32% of the board seats and own
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22% of the outstanding shares of the company. Institutional investors,
on average, own 20% of the firm's outstanding shares.
The summary statistics relative to past performance presented
in Panel D suggest that, on average, the firms in our sample tend to
underperform in the year prior to the private placement. Both the
average return on assets for the fiscal year preceding the year of the
private placement, and the buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns for
the year preceding the private placement are negative (-0.31 and 17%, respectively). After correcting for the industry median, Q has a
positive mean (1.02), but a negative median (-0.06).
The results presented in Table 2 reveals a number of differences
between firms seeking and firms circumventing shareholder approval
of board appointments. Firms that do not ask for approval are
significantly smaller, younger, distribute a lower portion of equity to
private investors in exchange for a smaller dollar amount, and appoint
a smaller number of directors. The two subsamples also differ along a
variety of governance dimensions. Firms that circumvent shareholder
approval of board appointments are characterized by a smaller board
prior to the placement, are more likely to have an insider as chairman,
have a higher proportion of insiders on the board, and have a lower
percentage of the outstanding equity owned by institutional investors.
Aside from board size, these differences in governance characteristics
are consistent with the hypothesis that entrenched managers are more
likely to avoid shareholder approval of board appointments at the time
of a private offering.
The only performance variable that is significantly different
between the two subsamples is Q. Firms that ask for shareholder
approval are characterized by a lower Q in the year preceding the
issue. Since Q is also a measure of growth opportunities, and the firms
in the approval subsample are significantly larger and older, this result
is not unexpected.

5. Determinants of shareholder approval
Firms have the discretion to ask shareholders to approve the
board appointment of representatives of the private purchasers. The
entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses suggest that when internal
control mechanisms are weak and agency problems are severe, firms
are more likely to bypass shareholder approval. According to the
approval irrelevance hypothesis, shareholder approval does not
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guarantee that the appointed directors will promote the interests of
shareholders and the firm might decide to avoid approval only to
reduce costs.
To investigate the possible motivations behind the decision to
ask for shareholder approval, we estimate a probit regression in which
the dependent variable is equal to one when the firm asks for
shareholder approval of board appointments and is zero otherwise.
The independent variables are the measures of internal and external
monitoring quality, past performance, firm characteristics, and issue
characteristics reported in Table 2.
The first two models of Table 3 reveal that when the chairman is
one of the top managers of the firm (lnsiderchair), the company is less
likely to ask for shareholder approval.9 Other board characteristics
such as board size and the percentage of insiders on the board do not
have a significant relation with approval. The Insiderchair variable
remains highly significant even after controlling for firm size (Lnassets)
and issue size (Fraction_placed). Other variables that are significantly
different between the approval/non-approval subsamples in the
univariate tests such as institutional ownership, number of directors
appointed, and stock exchange, fail to retain their significance after
controlling for other variables. We control for state provisions that
require shareholder approval to change the maximum number of
directors following the issuance of shares with the indicator variable
State_rule. We find that State_rule significantly affects the probability
that a firm will ask for shareholder approval of board appointments.
Past performance, measured as the abnormal Q in the year prior to
the private placement, is not significantly related to the decision to ask
for shareholder approval. 10
Models 10 and 11 include a modified version of our standardized
measure of Jensen (1986) free cash flow, Freecash_assets1.
Freecash_assets1 is equal to zero when free cash flows are negative
and it is equal to Freecash_assets when free cash flows are positive.
Since, as presented in Table 2, about half of our sample firms have
negative cash flows, this modification allows a better estimation of the
potential agency conflicts and entrenchment within our sample firms.
If firms bypass shareholder approval because they need to accelerate
the receipt of external funding, the coefficient of Freecash_assets1
should be positive. If free cash flow, however, measures managerial
entrenchment while firms with greater entrenchment tend to bypass
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shareholder approval, the coefficient should be negative. Our result is
consistent with the entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses. Even
after controlling for the type of security issued (Common and
Preferred), state provisions (State_rule), and the shareholder approval
of the security issued privately (Secur_approval), the two
entrenchment variables, Insiderchair and Freecash/assets1, are still
significantly related to the firm's decision to ask shareholders to
approve the appointment of directors in connection with the private
placement. 11
We estimate the economic significance of each coefficient for
model 11, the most comprehensive, as the change in the probability
that a firm will seek shareholder approval when the variable increases
from the 25th to the 75th percentile (or from zero to one for indicator
variables) while all other variables retain their median values. The
probability of seeking shareholder approval decreases by 2.16% when
Freecash/assets1 increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile.
Insiderchair demonstrates a stronger economic significance. The
probability of asking for shareholder approval for a firm in which one of
the top managers is also the chairman is 16.8% lower compared to a
firm in which the board chairman is an outsider. Among the control
variables, State_rule is most economically significant. The probability
of seeking shareholder approval for board appointments is 35.5%
higher when the applicable state law requires shareholders to approve
an increase in board size.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are consistent with the
entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses. We find that firms in which
the board chairman is a company manager and for which Jensen's
(1986) free cash flow is higher, are more likely to circumvent
shareholder approval. The test presented in Table 3 cannot distinguish
between the entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses since both
predict weak internal monitoring prior to private placements with
board appointments without shareholder approval. The analysis
reported in the following sections, however, allow us to further
examine the relative validity of these two hypotheses.

6. Monitoring quality of appointed directors
In this section we directly test our three hypotheses by
comparing the identities and activities of the directors appointed at the
time of the private placement regardless of shareholder approval
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status. The entrenchment hypothesis differs from the approval
irrelevance and monitoring hypotheses in its prediction regarding the
monitoring provided by the appointed directors. The entrenchment
hypothesis argues that firms with entrenched managers will tend to
appoint directors who support managers' decisions and do not provide
effective monitoring. To appoint such directors, management is likely
to bypass shareholder approval. According to the approval irrelevance
hypothesis, the quality of the newly appointed directors does not
depend on the firm's decision to seek shareholder approval since
managers are certain that shareholders, if asked, will automatically
approve management's nominees regardless of their characteristics.
Finally, the monitoring hypothesis predicts that firms that bypass
shareholders' approval will increase the board's monitoring quality.
This hypothesis contends that private investors demand immediate
board representation to prevent managerial exploitation of corporate
resources.
We measure the monitoring effectiveness of the appointed
directors by determining how many appointed directors are
independent, if they assume the board chairmanship, and their
membership on board committees. As indicated by several studies,
independent directors monitor managers more effectively and better
represent shareholders' interests. Weisbach (1988) finds that the
number of independent directors is positively related to the likelihood
of removal of poorly performing CEOs, while Byrd and Hickman (1992)
show that tender offers are characterized by higher bidder returns
when the board has a majority of independent directors. Brickley et al.
(1994) find that the market reacts positively when firms with a board
dominated by outsiders adopt a poison pill. Although a few firms in our
sample appoint new managers or managers of their own subsidiaries
to their board at the time of the private placement, the great majority
of these directors are either gray or independent. Gray directors
include relatives of top managers and outsiders with disclosed outside
business dealings with the company.12 We measure both the number
of independent directors appointed (Independent), and the ratio of the
number of independent appointed directors to the size of the board
after the placement (Fraction_ind). This latter measure allows us to
assess the aggregate decisional influence that the new independent
directors might have on the board.
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Since entrenched boards are less likely to delegate power to
new outside constituents, the appointment of one of the new directors
as chairman of the board, particularly if the director is independent, is
symptomatic of less entrenchment Jensen (1993) argues that when
the CEO rather than an independent director holds the board
chairmanship, the board ceases being an effective internal monitoring
device. Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover
to firm performance is significantly lower in firms where the same
individual holds both the CEO and chairman position. In our analysis
we create an independent variable equal to one when one of the
appointed directors is also appointed chairman of the board (Chair),
and an independent variable equal to one when one of the
independent appointed directors is also appointed chairman of the
board (Inc_chair).
Membership by the newly appointed directors on board
committees is another measure of corporate governance quality.
Membership on board committees can be viewed as a proxy for
monitoring intensity since board monitoring is a function not only of
the composition of the board as a whole, but also of the structure and
composition of the board committees. Kesner (1988) observes that
most important board decisions originate at the committee level. Klein
(1998) finds that overall board composition is unrelated to firm
performance, but that the structure of the compensation and audit
committees does impact performance. To measure the role that
appointed directors play on board committees, we measure the
fraction of all committee seats, audit committee seats, and
compensation committee seats that are filled by the appointed
directors.
Table 4 provides a set of descriptive univariate statistics for the
appointed directors. Firms that bypass shareholder approval appoint
on average 1.14 independent directors while firms seeking shareholder
approval appoint an average of 1.87 independent directors. The
difference in these means is significant at the 1% level. The ratio of
the number of independent appointed directors to the board size
averages 0.15 for the subsample of firms that bypass shareholder
approval, but 0.24 for the subsample of firms that seek it. This
difference is also significant at the 1% level. We find that firms asking
for shareholder approval are more likely to appoint one of the new
directors as board chairman, particularly when we exclude gray
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directors. Only 5% of the firms in the "no-approval" subsample
appoint a new independent director as chairman while 17% of the
firms in the "approval" subsample appoint a new independent director
as chairman. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The difference in the proportion of total committee, audit committee,
and compensation committee seats filled by appointed directors
between the two subsamples is not significant
As shown in Section 5, firms with an insider as chairman and
firms with larger amounts of free cash flow are more likely to bypass
shareholder approval of board appointments at the time of the private
placement To verify if the firm's decision to bypass shareholder
approval is related to the appointment of passive directors even after
controlling for other measures of managerial entrenchment, we
independently regress Fraction_ind and Inc_chair on the approval
indicator variable and several proxies for the quality of corporate
governance. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, firms that ask for
shareholder approval tend to appoint a larger number of private
investor representatives to the board. Since this factor might drive the
significant differences we observe in Table 4, we also control for the
number of directors appointed.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the regression in
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the number of appointed
independent directors to the total number of directors. Since several
firms fail to appoint any independent directors, the dependent variable
of the regression reported in Panel A is left-censored at zero. We
estimate a Tobit regression to account for the censoring of the
dependent variable. The approval indicator variable is positive and
significant even after controlling for firm size (Lnassets), and
governance variables. When we control for the number of directors
appointed (column 4 and 5) the approval indicator variable remains
statistically significant. The size of the board before the placement
(Board_size) is significantly negative at the 1% level. This variable is
significant because board size prior to the private placement is
positively correlated with board size after the placement, which is the
denominator of the dependent variable. Past performance, measured
as the abnormal Q in the year prior to the placement, is negative and
significantly related to the fraction of appointed independent directors.
This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1998).
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of a probit regression in
which the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one
when one of the appointed independent directors is also appointed
chairman of the board. The approval indicator variable is significantly
positive at the 5% level even after controlling for firm size (Lnassets),
governance variables, and the number of directors appointed.
Overall, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 support the
entrenchment hypothesis. Firms that circumvent shareholder approval
are more likely to appoint directors supportive of management and
unlikely to offer meaningful monitoring. Our result that firms with
entrenched management are more likely to bypass shareholders to
appoint fewer independent directors is also consistent with Shivdasani
and Yermack (1999).

7. Market reaction at the time of the
announcement
Our three hypotheses predict different market reactions to the
announcement of board appointments in connection with a private
placement. If the avoidance of shareholder approval is a manifestation
of agency problems, then the announcement of board appointments
conditional on shareholder approval should signal less entrenchment.
Consequently, such announcements should be received positively in
the marketplace. Alternatively, if voting by shareholders is irrelevant,
shareholder approval should have no effect on stock market returns
surrounding the announcement of such appointments. Finally, if
shareholders are bypassed to allow the immediate appointment of new
monitors to the board, then the market should not react more
positively to the announcement of board appointments conditional of
shareholder approval.

7.1. Announcement period returns
To ensure consistency in the information content of the
announcements, we eliminate from our sample ten firms that
announce the private placement and director appointments on
different days. We calculate abnormal returns around the
announcement date by estimating the market model over the day-300
to day-46 window relative to the announcement date. The market
return is proxied by the CRSP equally-weighted market index. Table 6
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day period beginning at the announcement date (0,1), a three-day
period centered around the announcement date (-1,1), and a five-day
period spanning days-2 through day+2. Since Factiva reports
announcements with the date and time at which they were originally
released, we believe that the (0,1) interval provides results with the
least potential to be affected by confounding events.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the CAARs for all the firms
announcing board appointments in connection with a private offering.
Consistent with the event studies on private placements by Wruck
(1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), the CAARs are positive and
statistically significant for all three examination windows. The
magnitude of these CAARs, however, is larger than those of previous
studies. The difference might be attributable to different samples since
we examine placements of common stock as well as hybrid securities.
Additionally, all of our sample offerings are associated with board
appointments, and none of the securities are placed with the issuing
firm's managers.
The CAARs for the non-approval and approval subsamples
reported in panels B and C provide preliminary evidence that firms
announcing board appointments conditional on shareholder approval
are associated with larger abnormal announcement returns. For the
(0,1) window, the cumulative abnormal return for the approval
subsample is 8.27% while that for the non-approval subsample is
4.96%.
To isolate the effect of circumvention of shareholder approval on
market returns from the other information contained in the security
issuance announcement, we control for a set of variables associated
with capital raising by estimating a series of OLS regressions with the
cumulative abnormal returns for the (0,1) window as the dependent
variable. We provide the results of these regressions in Table 7. When
the approval-of-directors indicator variable (Approval) is the only
independent variable, its coefficient is positive and large in magnitude,
but not significant. When the security approval indicator variable
(Secur_approval) is introduced into the model, the approval of
directors becomes statistically significant at the 10% level. The
security approval indicator is negative and statistically significant. As
discussed in Section 3, in many cases firms ask for shareholder
approval of the security issuance when the listing exchange requires
them to do so. Moreover, shareholder approval of the security
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issuance is sometimes associated with amendments in the charter that
can be deleterious to shareholders. For example, firms that ask
shareholders to approve the issuance of preferred convertible shares
might also amend the charter to include a blank check preferred stock
provision. This provision can be used as a takeover defense since it
allows the implementation of poison pills without shareholder approval,
and therefore it might be negatively received by the market. The
introduction of anti-takeover amendments explains, at least partially,
the sign of the coefficient for Secur_approval.13
The announcement of a private placement associated with board
appointments also provides investors with information about the
identity of the new directors and a possible change in board size. To
control for the potential effect of this additional information on
announcement returns, in column (3) of Table 7 we include as
regressors the fraction of newly appointed independent directors
(Fraction_ind) and the change in board size (Board_size_change).
These two variables are not significant; however, the director approval
indicator variable remains significant at the 5% level. The director
approval indicator variable remains significant even after the
introduction of firms size, the level of free cash flow and several
control variables associated with the private offering such as the
fraction of shares placed, the type of security placed, the change in the
ownership by officers, directors, and outside blockholders due to the
private placement, whether the private purchaser is a corporation, and
state provisions. In the reported regressions we consider the fraction
of stock owned by firms managed or owned by directors as part of
directors' stock ownership. When we consider that fraction as owned
by outside blockholders, our results do not significantly change.

7.2. Discounted adjusted abnormal returns
Wruck (1989) observes that private equity is usually sold at a
discount to compensate the purchaser for positively contributing to
firm value or for maintaining managerial entrenchment. Consequently,
the abnormal return observed around the announcement of a private
placement must be adjusted for this component representing
compensation to the private purchaser. To measure the abnormal
return due only to the information revealed to the market, we use the
model developed by Bradley and Wakeman (1983) and applied by
Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) to calculate the discount-
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adjusted abnormal returns (DAAR). Since the Bradley and Wakeman
model applies only to common stock placements, we calculate DAAR
for only the 67 firms of our sample that place common stock to private
investors and announce the private offering and appointment of
directors on the same day.14
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, the discount-adjusted abnormal
returns for our subsample of common stock private placements is
large (11.60%) and statistically significant. The DAAR for the six firms
that seek shareholder approval of board appointments is very large
(38.8%) and significantly higher than the DAAR of the firms that
bypass shareholder approval. We further analyze the effect of
shareholder approval of directorships on discount-adjusted abnormal
returns by estimating an OLS regression with DAAR as the dependent
variable. Panel B of Table 8 contains the results. The director approval
variable is significantly positive at the 5% level even after the
introduction of the control variables used in Table 7.
Overall, this event study analysis shows that the market
strongly rewards firms that submit their director candidates for
shareholder approval. This result is consistent with the entrenchment
hypothesis. The market reacts positively to the announcement of
shareholder approval because it infers a lower level of entrenchment
and consequently revises its estimations of the firm's future cash
flows.

8. Does shareholder approval impact
performance?
The entrenchment hypothesis predicts that firms seeking
shareholder approval perform better than firms bypassing shareholder
approval since the firm's decision to ask for shareholder approval is a
manifestation of better corporate governance. Alternatively, the
approval irrelevance hypothesis predicts that the approval of
directorships does not affect the firm's future performance. Finally, the
monitoring hypothesis predicts that companies bypass shareholder
approval to grant immediate board representation to private investors
who wish to monitor the company. Therefore, firms that bypass
shareholder approval, ceteris paribus, might improve performance
relative to those firms that seek shareholder approval. We examine
both the firms' operating and stock performance following private
placements associated with board appointments to determine what
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impact the level of managerial entrenchment implied by the
approval/non-approval of these appointments has on the firm's
performance.

8.1. Operating performance
We estimate abnormal operating performance by using the Lie
(2001) modification of the Barber and Lyon (1996) method as applied
by Grullon and Michaely (2004). The abnormal operating performance
is calculated as the operating performance of the sample firm minus
the operating performance of the matching firm. Our measure of
operating performance is operating income before depreciation scaled
by the average of the beginning-period and ending-period book value
of total assets (ROA). We select matching firms that have the same
industry classification as the sample firms and are comparable in their
level of performance during the year preceding the private issue (year1), their change in performance from year-2 to year-1, and their
market-to-book ratio for year-1.
The results from this analysis are not tabulated, but available
upon request from the authors. Our aggregate sample of firms that
appoint directors in connection with a private offering significantly
underperform in the fiscal year including the private issue date. This
result is consistent with the evidence offered by Hertzel et al. (2002).
The abnormal operating performance for the approval subsample is
significantly positive in all three years following the private offering.
Most importantly, when we compare the approval/non-approval
subsamples we find that the difference of the medians in year one, the
difference of the means in year two, and both the difference of the
means and medians in year three are positive and significant. This
result reveals that firms that seek shareholder approval of board
appointments at the time of the private placement perform
significantly better in the three years following the offering than firms
that bypass shareholder approval. The significant difference in
performance between the two approval subsamples is consistent with
the entrenchment and monitoring hypothesis.

8.2. Stock performance
8.2.1. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns
We calculate BHARs for the first 3 years following the
announcement of private placements by matching each firm in our
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sample to a matching firm by size and book-to-market ratio as
suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997). Consistent with Hertzel et al.
(2002), the BHARs following private placements are negative and large
in magnitude. The difference in the BHARs between the approval and
non-approval sub-samples, however, is statistically insignificant.
When we consider the BHARs at the end of the first, second,
and third year following the private placement, we find that the stocks
of firms asking for shareholder approval of directorships significantly
outperform those of firms that bypass shareholder approval. The mean
of the difference between the one-year BHARs of the approval/nonapproval subsamples as well as the corresponding difference for the
three-year BHARs are statistically significant.

8.2.2. Calendar-time abnormal returns
As noted by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the
buy-and-hold method does not account for cross-sectional dependence
in returns. We address this issue by also estimating three-year
abnormal returns using the calendar-time approach. For each calendar
month in our sample period, we form a portfolio of the sample firms
that have announced a private placement during the last 36 months.
We exclude those months with less than ten firms in the portfolio. We
then regress the monthly portfolio excess returns on the three Fama
and French (1993) factors.
The calendar-time regression indicates that the three-year
abnormal return is -10.58%. The three-year abnormal return for the
non-approval sample and approval sample are -17.65% and +27.98%,
respectively. To investigate if the difference of the portfolio abnormal
returns for the two approval subsamples is significant, we regress the
difference in the monthly portfolio excess returns for the two
subsamples on the three Fama and French (1993) factors. The
difference of the three-year abnormal returns for the two subsamples
is large, (73.36%), but insignificant. 15

8.3. Long-term performance and announcement
returns
Overall, the long-term performance results are consistent with
the entrenchment hypothesis. The difference in the abnormal
operating performance between the two approval subsamples is
significant in the 3 years following the private placement. Even though
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the buy-and-hold stock returns are partially suggestive of a difference
in the long-term stock performance between the approval/nonapproval subsamples, when we control for cross-sectional dependence
in returns with the calendar time portfolio method, the statistical
significance vanishes. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical significance
in the difference of long-term stock performance between the two
subsamples does not contradict the entrenchment hypothesis. In an
efficient market, the increase in share price should occur when a firm
announces the decision to seek shareholder approval and not gradually
in the following years.

9. Conclusions
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of the
appointment of directors to corporate boards without shareholder
approval in the context of private placements. We show that firms with
greater managerial entrenchment are more likely to bypass
shareholder approval for their appointments. Such firms are also less
likely to appoint independent directors or to elect one of the appointed
directors as chairman of the board. Moreover, the stock market reacts
more positively to the announcement of the private offering when the
firm submits the board candidates for shareholder approval. Finally,
firms that bypass shareholder approval underperform compared to
firms that obtain shareholder approval.
Overall, the results of this study are consistent with recent
findings by Wu (2004) and Barclay et al. (2007-this issue) that
challenge the conventional view of private placements as enhancing
the quality of monitoring. Although there are multiple reasons for the
private placement of securities, our findings indicate that
entrenchment has a stronger influence on the private placement
process than previously believed.
Our results are also consistent with the view that entrenched
managers are likely to nominate directors that protect managers'
positions and interests. Since such directors do not represent the
interests of outside shareholders, entrenched managers will adopt
strategies that allow them to appoint "friendly" directors without
asking for shareholder approval.
The current process for soliciting shareholder approval of board
appointments surrounding private placements is not fully consistent
with effective corporate governance. The various stratagems that
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managers can adopt to avoid shareholder approval neutralize the
monitoring provided by shareholder voting. Our findings align with the
observations of Bebchuck (2005) who argues that "shareholders'
existing power to replace directors is insufficient to secure the
adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements that
management disfavors." Indeed, those firms that could benefit the
most from the monitoring provided by shareholder approval are those
most likely to avoid it.
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See for example "Stock Activism's Latest Weapon" By Mark
Maremont and Erin White, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2006.
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If shareholders are not satisfied by the management's slate
they can propose their own candidates. Excluding contests
related to M&A activity, Bebchuk (2003) reports that there were
77 contested director proxies between 1996 and 2002.
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Therefore it is plausible that managers expect the probability of
shareholders rejecting management slate to be greater than
zero.


4

One might argue that firms bypass shareholder approval when
they are in financial distress and have an immediate need for
funds. Immediacy concerns, however, do not require managers
to circumvent the shareholder approval process regarding the
appointment of directors. Firms in financial distress can execute
an immediate private placement of securities and wait until the
annual meeting to appoint the new directors.
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Convertible notes require shareholder approval at the time of
the conversion if the corporation's authorized common shares
are less than the shares resulting from the conversion.
See Rule 312.03 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual, Nasdaq
Marketplace Rule 4350(i), and Section 713 of the AMEX
Company Guide.
See MBCA sec. 10.20; DGCL sec. 109. Only a few states,
including California, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia,
require shareholder approval to change the maximum number
of directors following share issuance. We control for such a
provision in our multivariate analysis.
Bajaj et al. (2000) report that 22% of all securities fraud class
action law suits during the 1991-1999 period are claims of
breaches of fiduciary responsibility. The Stanford University
Security Class Action Clearinghouse serves as an authoritative
source of data regarding such litigation. It reports for 2005 that
93% of the cases filed in 2005 were due to Section 10b-5
(untrue statements and fraud), Section 11 (false registration
statements) or Section 12(2) (false statements in prospectuses
or other communications). Such claims are often then linked
with breaches of fiduciary responsibilities by directors or
corporate managers.
We obtain similar results when we substitute this variable with
Ceochair, an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO is
also the chairman of the board.
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When we substitute abnormal Q with an industry-normed
ROA, we obtain similar results.
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In unreported regressions we also estimate the effect of a
CEO tenure variable, and of an indicator equal to one when the
CEO is the founder of the firm. The coefficients of these
variables are not significant.
The private investment is not considered a business dealing
by itself. Private investors who are appointed to the board are
classified as independent if they do not have other business
connections with the issuer.
The negative coefficient of Secur_approval does not mean
that the reaction of the announcement of a private placement
that requires shareholder approval is negative, but only that is
less positive since the unconditional abnormal return is larger in
magnitude than the Secur_approval coefficient.
Some of these firms also place hybrid securities additionally
to common shares. We control for this in the OLS regressions 5
and 6 reported in Panel B of Table 8.
When we calculate calendar-time abnormal returns using the
correction proposed by Shumway (1997) and Shumway and
Warther (1999) for companies which delist, the results are not
significantly different.
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Appendix A. Description of variables
The variables are reported in alphabetical order
Variable

Definition

Age

Number of years from the CRSP listing date to the
offering date

Alliance

Indicator variable equal to one when the private investor
is a corporation

Approval

Indicator variable equal to one when the firm appoints
directors with shareholder approval

Assets

Total assets of the firm expressed in millions of dollars
calculated at the end of the fiscal year preceding the
private placement

Audit

Proportion of audit committee seats filled by the
directors appointed in connection with the private
placement

Board_size

Size of the board before the private placement

Board_size_change Difference between board size after the placement and
board size before the placement divided by the board
size before the placement
Ceochair

Indicator variable that is equal to one when the chief
executive officer of the firm is also the chairman of the
board before the private placement

Chair

Indicator variable equal to one when one of the directors
appointed in connection with the private placement is
also appointed chairman of the board

Committee

Proportion of committee seats filled by the directors
appointed in connection with the private placement

Common

Indicator variable equal to one when the company issues
common stock

Compensation

Proportion of compensation committee seats filled by the
directors appointed in connection with the private
placement

Delta_block_own

Difference of outside blockholder stock ownership before
and after the private placement

Delta_offdir_own

Difference of directors' and officers' stock ownership
before and after the private placement

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September 2007): pg. 485-510. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

30

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Variable

Definition

Dir_appointed

Number of directors appointed at the time of the private
placement

Founder

Indicator variable that is equal to one when the CEO is
also one of the founders of the firm

Fraction_ind

Number of independent directors appointed divided by
the board size after the placement

Fraction_placed

Portion of common stock of the firm distributed through
the private placement (after conversion of preferred
shares, convertible notes, and warrants)

Freecash/assets

Operating income before depreciation, minus income
taxes corrected for the annual change in deferred taxes,
minus interest expense on debt, minus dividends on
preferred stock and common stock, all divided by the
value of total assets

Freecash/assets1

Equal to Freecash/assets if Freecash/assets > 0 and
equal to 0 if Freecash/assets ≤ 0

Ind_chair

Indicator variable equal to one when one of the
independent directors appointed in connection with the
private placement is also appointed chairman of the
board

Independent

Number of independent directors appointed in
connection with the private placement

Insider_own

Share ownership of officers and directors before the
private placement

Insiderchair

Indicator variable that is equal to one when one of the
top managers of the firm is also the chairman of the
board before the private placement

Insiders

Number of insiders on the board divided by board size
before the placement

Inst_own

Institutional share ownership before the private
placement

Leverage

Total debt divided by total assets calculated at the end
of the fiscal year preceding the private placement

Lnassets

Natural logarithm of Assets

Marketcap

Market capitalization of the firm on the day of the
announcement of the private placement expressed in
millions of dollars
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Variable

Definition

NYSE

Indicator variable equal to one when the firm's common
stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange

Preferred

Indicator variable equal to one when the company issues
convertible preferred stock

Proceed

Size of the offering expressed in millions of dollars

Q

Ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value
of equity plus the book value of assets to the book value
of assets calculated at the end of the fiscal year
preceding the private placement

Qabn

Q of the firm before the private placement corrected by
the median industry Q

Rel_ceo_tenure

Ratio between the years of CEO tenure and the years
from the incorporation of the company to the issue

Ret-ew-1

Buy-and-hold abnormal return for the year preceding
the private issue calculated by subtracting the monthly
return of the CRSP equally-weighted index from the
monthly return of the firm's stock

ROA

Return on assets calculated at the end of the fiscal year
preceding the private placement

Secur_approval

Indicator variable equal to one when the company asks
for shareholder approval of the security issuance

State_rule

Indicator variable equal to one when the state of
incorporation requires shareholder approval to change
the maximum number of directors allowed after the
issuance of shares

Table 1. Distribution and homogeneity tests of sample firms across market,
issuance, and governance characteristics
Full No-App App
Panel A: exchange
NYSE
AMEX
NASDAQ

24

14

10

(13.3) (9.5)

(29.4)

20

2

18

(11.1) (12.2)

(5.9)

135

22

113
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Full No-App App
OTC

(74.6) (76.9)

(64.7)

2

2

0

(1.1)

(1.4)

(0.0)

Fisher test p-value

0.017

Panel B: security
Common
Convertible preferred
Convertible notes
Loan
Combinations

71

67

4

(38.4) (44.7)

(11.4)

78

22

56

(42.2) (37.3)

(62.9)

27

6

21

(14.6) (14.0)

(17.1)

1

1

0

(0.5)

(0.7)

(0.0)

8

5

3

(4.3)

(3.3)

(8.6)

Fisher test p-value

0.002

Panel C: security approval
No
Yes

119

110

9

(65.7) (74.8)

(26.5)

62

25

37

(34.3) (25.2)
Fisher test p-value

(73.5)

< 0.001

Panel D: investors
Corporations
Individuals
Investment firms

36

29

7

(19.4) (19.4)

(20.0)

8

7

1

(4.3)

(4.7)

(2.9)

111

90

21

(60.0) (60.0)

(60.0)
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Full No-App App
Investment firms and individuals 30

24

(16.2) (16.0)
Fisher test p-value

6
(17.1)

0.970

Panel E: directors appointed
1
2
3
4
≥5

91

80

11

(49.2) (53.3)

(31.4)

55

11

44

(29.7) (29.3)

(31.4)

17

10

7

(9.2)

(6.7)

(20.0)

15

10

5

(8.1)

(6.7)

(14.3)

7

6

1

(3.9)

(4.0)

(2.9)

Fisher test p-value

0.034

Panel F: impact on board size
Addition
Replacement
Mixed
Fisher test p-value

117

98

19

(63.2) (65.3)

(54.3)

52

12

40

(28.1) (26.7)

(34.3)

16

12

4

(8.6)

(8.0)

(11.4)

0.468

“Full” refers to a sample of 181 U.S. firms that appoint directors in combination with
private offerings between 1995 and 2000. “No-App” refers to the subsample of firms
that appoint directors without shareholder approval, and “App” refers to the
subsample of firms that appoint directors with shareholder approval. The percentage
of firms in each group is reported in parenthesis. The p-values for Fisher's exact tests
of homogeneity between the two approval subsamples are reported at the bottom of
each panel.
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Table 2. Firm characteristics, issue characteristics, governance, and past
performance variables for the full sample, the subsample formed by firms that
appoint directors without shareholder approval (“No-App”), and that with
shareholder approval (“App”)
Full
No-App
sample

App

Diff

t-stat or
ChiSquare
(Wilc.Z)

pvalue

Panel A: firm characteristics
Assets
Marketcap
Age
Freecash/assets
Leverage

217.0

165.6

438.9

273.3

2.45

0.019

(47.3)

(37.0)

(142.4) (105.4) (2.45)

(0.014)

182.8

185.5

154.0

− 31.51

− 0.47

0.643

(53.4)

(45.5)

(77.8)

(32.3)

(1.85)

(0.065)

6.17

5.75

7.97

2.22

1.60

0.117

(4.14)

(4.02)

(6.01)

(1.98)

(1.64)

(0.100)

− 0.23

− 0.22

− 0.27

− 0.055

− 0.50

0.623

(− 0.04) (− 0.05) (− 0.04) (0.01)

(− 0.03)

(0.974)

0.29

0.28

0.33

0.052

1.29

0.204

(0.24)

(0.23)

(0.29)

(0.06)

(1.11)

(0.269)

0.26

0.24

0.32

0.08

2.53

0.012

(0.20)

(0.19)

(0.31)

(0.12)

(3.02)

(0.003)

46.74

42.56

64.81

22.24

0.80

0.424

(10.00)

(9.60)

(27.50) (17.90) (3.04)

(0.003)

1.89

1.79

2.32

0.53

2.43

0.016

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2.83)

(0.005)

0.24

0.29

0.043

1.46

0.147

(0.20)

(0.25)

(0.05)

−2.17

(0.030)

6.53

6.39

7.12

0.72

1.92

0.057

(6)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2.12)

(0.034)

0.54

0.57

0.41

− 0.16

2.84

0.092

na

na

na

na

na

na

Panel B: issue characteristics
Fraction_placed
Proceed
Dir_appointed

Board_size_change 0.25
(0.20)
Panel C: governance
Board_size
Ceochair
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Full
No-App
sample

Insiderchair
Insiders
Founder
Insider_own
Inst_own

App

Diff

t-stat or
ChiSquare
(Wilc.Z)

pvalue

0.68

0.73

0.47

− 0.26

8.40

0.004

na

na

na

na

na

na

0.32

0.33

0.27

− 0.06

− 1.68

0.095

(0.29)

(0.29)

(0.25)

(− 0.04) (− 2.00)

(0.046)

0.33

0.31

0.41

0.10

1.22

0.269

na

na

na

na

na

na

0.22

0.22

0.24

0.01

0.46

0.643

(0.19)

(0.18)

(0.20)

(0.02)

(0.56)

(0.575)

0.20

0.18

0.28

0.09

1.84

0.074

(0.13)

(0.11)

(0.23)

(0.11)

(1.61)

(0.117)

2.86

3.04

2.07

− 0.97

− 1.65

0.102

(1.50)

(1.60)

(1.20)

(− 0.40) (−2.43)

(0.015)

1.02

1.13

0.58

− 0.55

0.328

Panel D: past performance
Q
Qabn
ROA
Ret-ew-1

− 0.98

(− 0.06) (− 0.03) (− 0.15) (− 0.11) (− 0.78)

(0.436)

− 0.31

0.05

0.962

(− 0.03) (− 0.04) (− 0.01) (0.03)

(− 0.26)

(0.795)

− 0.17

− 0.70

0.485

− 0.17
− 0.14

− 0.16
− 0.30

0.00
− 0.16

(− 0.55) (− 0.55) (− 0.56) (− 0.01) (− 0.15)

(0.877)

The table presents the t-statistics and p-values of the difference of the means, and the
Wilcoxon z-statistics and p-values of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney non-parametric
test. For indicator variables we report chi-square statistics and its corresponding pvalues. Statistically significant differences, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are
reported in bold. All variables are defined in the Appendix.

Table 3. Determinants of shareholder approval — probit regressions
(1)
Intercept

Board_size

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

− 1.266

− 1.774

− 1.668

− 1.884

− 1.711

− 1.708

− 1.706

− 1.737

− 1.587

− 1.709

− 1.588

(0.042)

(0.005)

(0.010)

(0.006)

(< 0.001)

(< 0.001)

(< 0.001)

(< .0001)

(< 0.001)

(< 0.001)

(0.001)

− 0.010

0.002

− 0.006

− 0.021

(0.873)

(0.979)

(0.924)

(0.759)
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(1)
Insiders

Insiderchair

Insider_ownership

(2)

(3)

(4)

− 0.545

− 0.065

0.084

(0.489)

(0.403)

(0.921)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

− 0.650

− 0.631

− 0.805

− 0.985

− 0.798

− 0.811

− 0.806

− 0.804

− 0.794

− 0.789

− 0.790

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.001)

(< 0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.004)

0.867

1.024

(0.187)

(0.136)

− 1.798

− 2.016

Rel_ceo_tenure

− 0.0591
(0.136)

Freecash/assets1

Lnassets

(0.082)

(0.096)

0.193

0.178

0.191

0.250

0.167

0.188

0.197

0.186

0.144

0.202

0.164

(0.005)

(0.009)

(0.006)

(0.001)

(0.025)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.053)

(0.002)

(0.035)

1.994

2.003

1.991

1.998

1.841

1.899

1.952

1.116

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.040)

(0.007)

(0.005)

(0.162)

Fraction_placed

State_rule

1.028

1.318

(0.010)

(0.002)

Inst_ownership

0.004
(0.979)

Qabn

− 0.005
(0.866)

Leverage

− 0.106
(0.826)

Directors_appointed

0.035
(0.775)

NYSE

0.428
(0.231)

Common

− 0.817
(0.039)

Preferred

0.057
(0.854)

Secur_approval

0.618
(0.002)

Goodness of fit

1.10

1.10

1.19

1.21

1.19

1.18

1.15

1.17

1.20

1.22

1.33

Log-likelihood

− 78.1

− 77.1

− 75.0

− 71.8

− 74.8

− 75.0

− 75.0

− 74.9

− 74.3

− 74.7

− 64.2

The dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to one when the firm asks
for shareholder approval to appoint representatives of the private investors to the
board. Comparable to Palia (2001) and Fama and French (2002) we set the missing
observations of Compustat variables to zero and use indicator variables that are set to
unity for the missing observations. Goodness of fit is calculated as in McIntosh and
Dorfman (1992). The p-values of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis.
Statistically significant coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported
in bold. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix.
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Table 4. Monitoring role of appointed directors — univariate analysis
No-approval
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Approval
N Mean

Difference

Median

Mean

pMedian
value

pvalue

Independent

151 1.14

1

30 1.87

2

0.73

0.002 1

0.004

Fraction_ind

151 0.15

0.14

30 0.24

0.22

0.08

0.005 0.08

0.011

Chair

145 0.09

na

30 0.20

na

0.11

0.089 na

na

Ind_chair

145 0.05

na

30 0.17

na

0.12

0.025 na

na

Committee

139 0.21

0.20

29 0.23

0.24

0.02

0.546 0.04

0.355

Audit

139 0.22

0.25

29 0.21

0.33

− 0.01 0.898 0.08

0.859

Compensation

139 0.19

0.00

29 0.21

0.25

0.02

0.580

0.748 0.25

The p-values refer to two-sample t-tests for the mean, Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney non-parametric tests for the median, and chi-square
tests for indicator variables (i.e., Chair and Ind_chair). Statistically
significant differences, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are
reported in bold. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Table 5. Monitoring role of appointed directors — multivariate analysis

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel A: fraction of independent appointed directors
Intercept

0.118

0.108

0.208

0.129

0.129

0.142

(< 0.00 (0.008) (< 0.00 (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
1)
1)
Approval

0.101

0.117

0.119

0.085

0.080

0.076

(0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.032) (0.046)
Lnassets

− 0.005 0.002

− 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.007

(0.523) (0.787) (0.732) (0.709) (0.400)
Insidechair

0.052

0.043

0.035

0.035

0.037

(0.103) (0.165) (0.212) (0.204) (0.192)
Freecash/assets
1
Board_size

− 0.199 − 0.258 − 0.209 − 0.203 − 0.211
(0.496) (0.373) (0.415) (0.429) (0.408)
− 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01
9
9
9
8
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel A: fraction of independent appointed directors
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Number_appoin
ted

0.061

0.061

0.060

(< 0.00 (< 0.00 (< 0.00
1)
1)
1)

Secur_approval

0.013

0.023

(0.669) (0.454)
Q_abn

− 0.00
6
(0.099)

State_rule

− 0.015
(0.731)

Log-likelihood

− 15.32 − 12.00 − 9.02

5.02

5.08

6.53

Panel B: one of the independent appointed directors is chairman
Intercept

− 1.59 − 1.90 − 2.00 − 2.31 − 2.12 − 2.19
7
1
0
8
6
7
(< 0.00 (< 0.00 (0.001) (< 0.00 (< 0.00 (0.001)
1)
1)
1)
1)

Approval

0.629

0.846

0.842

0.747

0.948

0.943

(0.050) (0.021) (0.021) (0.049) (0.031) (0.043)
Lnassets

− 0.060 − 0.068 − 0.079 − 0.071 − 0.094
(0.465) (0.444) (0.374) (0.428) (0.355)

Insidechair

0.482

0.491

0.463

0.428

0.415

(0.199) (0.193) (0.239) (0.283) (0.310)
Freecash/assets
1
Board_size

1.596

1.633

1.853

1.382

1.423

(0.576) (0.568) (0.536) (0.655) (0.658)
0.019

− 0.004 − 0.004 0.004

(0.815) (0.961) (0.963) (0.963)
0.248

0.268

0.272
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel A: fraction of independent appointed directors
Number_appoin
ted

(0.029) (0.021) (0.020)

Secur_approval

− 0.408 − 0.386
(0.319) (0.359)

Q_abn

− 0.065
(0.484)

State_rule

− 0.010
(0.985)

Goodness of fit 1.00
Log-likelihood

1.08

1.08

1.08

1.08

1.08

− 44.56 − 41.31 − 41.21 − 39.08 − 38.55 − 38.22

Panel A presents the coefficients of a Tobit regression in which the dependent variable
is the number of independent appointed directors divided by the board size after the
placement. Panel B presents the coefficients of a probit regression in which the
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one when one of the independent
directors appointed in connection with the private placement is also appointed
chairman of the board. Goodness of fit is calculated as in McIntosh and Dorfman
(1992). The p-values of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis. Statistically
significant coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. All
independent variables are defined in the Appendix.

Table 6. Abnormal announcement returns
CAAR (%) Pos:Neg

Z

SCS Z

t

Panel A: full sample (N = 171)
(0,1)

5.58

104:67

9.294

4.551 7.765

(− 2,2) 10.16

115:56

10.430 6.296 8.942

(− 1,1) 7.48

116:55

9.851

5.689 8.498

Panel B: no-approval sample (N = 139)
(0,1)

4.96

84:55

7.870

3.766 6.288

(− 2,2) 10.06

91:48

9.684

5.543 8.068

(− 1,1) 7.01

94:45

8.616

4.819 7.253
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CAAR (%) Pos:Neg

Z

SCS Z

t

Panel C: approval sample (N = 32)
(0,1)

8.27

20:12

5.084

2.764 5.607

(− 2,2) 10.58

24:8

3.926

3.263 4.536

(− 1,1) 9.53

22:10

4.814

3.247 5.273

We calculate the abnormal announcement returns by means of a market model with
an estimation period of 253 days that terminates 46 days before the announcement.
The full sample is formed only by firms that announce the private placement and
appointment of directors on the same day. The market returns used in the model are
the CRSP equally-weighted returns. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return,
pos:neg is the number of firms with positive:negative abnormal returns, Z is the z
statistics of the Patell (1976) test, SCS Z is the z statistics of the Boehmer et al.
(1991) test, and t is the t-statistic with the time series correction of Brown and Warner
(1985).

Table 7. Abnormal announcement returns — OLS regressions

Intercept
Approval
Secur_approval
Fraction_ind
Board_size_change
Fraction_placed
Delta_offdir_own
Delta_inst_own
Lnassets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.049

0.064

0.052

0.048

0.047

(< 0.001) (0.015)

(0.020)

(0.063)

(0.208) (0.843)

0.044

0.063

0.076

0.076

0.066

(0.163)

(0.058)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.060) (0.074)

− 0.010
0.065

− 0.046 − 0.046 − 0.048 − 0.044 − 0.043
(0.070)

(0.074)

(0.070)

(0.105) (0.114)

0.005

− 0.008 − 0.015 0.016

(0.955)

(0.927)

(0.871) (0.876)

0.064

0.062

0.076

(0.450)

(0.467)

(0.382) (0.470)

0.031

0.001

(0.725)

(0.994) (0.946)
0.041

0.062
− 0.007
0.057

(0.630) (0.519)
0.065

0.055

(0.457) (0.541)
0.002

0.007

(0.457) (0.385)
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.055

Common

(0.103)
0.023

Preferred

(0.480)
− 0.213

Freecash/assets1

(0.378)
0.021

Alliance

(0.542)
0.012

State_rule
Adjusted R

(6)

(0.792)
2

0.006

0.019

0.017

0.012

0.051

0.024

The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for the
announcement day and the following day (interval [0,1]). The p-values of the
coefficients are reported in parenthesis. Statistically significant coefficients, at a
minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. All independent variables are
defined in the Appendix.

Table 8. Discount-adjusted abnormal returns
Panel A: univariate analysis
DAAR

t-stat

p-value

N

Full

11.60

3.68

0.005

67

No-app

9.33

3.24

0.002

61

App

38.82

1.94

0.109

6

Diff

29.50

2.60

0.012

Panel B: multivariate analysis

Intercept
Approval

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.093

0.107

0.140

0.129

− 0.033 − 0.150

(0.004) (0.007)

(0.016)

(0.078)

(0.205)

(0.492)

0.295

0.329

0.329

0.333

0.375

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.021)

(0.019)

0.323

(0.012) (0.011)
Secur_approval

(5)

(6)

− 0.042 − 0.065 − 0.071 − 0.037 − 0.016
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Panel B: multivariate analysis
(1)

(2)
(0.537)

Fraction_ind
Dir_change

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(0.364)

(0.351)

(0.664)

(0.858)

0.310

0.311

0.210

0.068

(0.292)

(0.293)

(0.522)

(0.879)

− 0.309 − 0.314 − 0.244 − 0.154
(0.138)

Fraction_placed

(0.137)

(0.275)

(0.522)

0.065

0.036

− 0.039

(0.803)

(0.903)

(0.896)

0.121

0.214

(0.471)

(0.235)

0.164

0.197

(0.586)

(0.533)

0.261

0.236

(0.364)

(0.418)

0.010

0.028

(0.675)

(0.350)

Common
Delta_offdir_own
Delta_inst_own
Lnassets
Freecash/assets1

− 1.050
(0.233)

Alliance

0.015
(0.892)

State_rule

−0.023
(0.814)

Adjusted R2

0.083

0.103

0.082

0.068

0.020

0.027

Panel A presents the discount-adjusted abnormal return (DAARs) calculated as in
Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993). “Full” refers to the full sample, “No-app”
refers to the subsample of firms that appoint directors without shareholder approval,
and “App” refers to the subsample of firms that appoint directors with shareholder
approval. “Diff” is the difference between the DAARs of the two approval subsamples.
The sample is formed only by firms that privately issue common stock and announce
the private offering and the board appointments on the same day. Panel B presents
the coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the DAAR. The
p-values of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis. Statistically significant
coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. All independent
variables are defined in the Appendix.
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